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Abstract 
The production efficiencies of household specialization have declined with the development of 
technologies simplifying household production.  Additionally, the opportunity cost of having a household 
specialist has risen as barriers to women in the workplace have been eroded.  These developments, which 
have made way for an increase in the relative importance of the consumption benefits from marriage, 
have not impacted all families similarly. This paper examines how marital and fertility patterns have 
changed along racial and educational lines for men and women.  Marriage and remarriage rates have risen 
for women with a college degree relative to women with fewer years of education, eroding a long-
standing gap caused by greater marriage propensities among less educated women.  In contrast, there has 
been little change in marital patterns by education for men.  Divorce has been falling for all groups, but 
fell earlier and more sharply among college graduates.  Fertility has historically declined with women’s 
educational attainment and that pattern continues, with the total number of births having changed little by 
women's educational attainment, despite the large increases in educational attainment for women. 
However, there has been a rise in the age of educated mothers, with little change in fertility timing for 
those with less education. 
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I.  Introduction 
The family is a constantly changing institution.  In the last half century, marriage and 
fertility rates have fallen, divorce rates have risen, and the character of marriage has changed.  
These developments have occurred in the wake of widespread social, legal, and technological 
changes that have impacted the incentives for individuals to form and invest in marriages and 
children.    These  changes  have  not  impacted  all  families  similarly,  and  in  this  article,  we 
investigate how family behavior has changed for women of different educational backgrounds.  
Gary Becker’s 1981 Treatise on the Family proposed an economic theory of families 
based on “production complementarities”, in which husband and wife specialize in the market 
and domestic spheres, respectively, and hence are more productive together than apart.  Becker 
emphasized that families are production units that produce both goods in the house (like clean 
laundry, well-cared for children) and in the marketplace.  By having one person specialize in 
domestic responsibilities (most often a wife as homemaker), while the other supports the spouse 
and children financially (typically a husband as breadwinner), couples are more efficient than 
singles.   
However, the view of the family as a source of production efficiencies has become less 
relevant over time.  The twentieth century brought the development of labor and skill saving 
technological progress in the home.  This technological change simplified clothes washing and 
drying,  cooking  (through  the  development  of  pre-processed  foods  and  microwaves), 
dishwashing, and housecleaning.  Technological progress also encouraged the shift from home 
production to purchasing items in the market through the development of cheaper mass-produced 
items like ready-made clothes.  Technological change has impacted home production through 
three  channels.    The  first  is  by  making  home  production  more  efficient.  The  second  is  by 
reducing the returns to specialized domestic skills as these technologies substitute capital for 
skilled labor.  And the third is by making market-produced goods a closer substitute for home-
produced goods, which in turn makes market work a closer substitute for domestic work.  While 
some of the effect of these changes was likely an increase in the amount and quality of home 
production, overall time spent in home production fell.  Moreover, there was a shift in home 
production  away  from  specialists  toward  non-specialists.    Between  1965  and  2003  home 
production by women fell between 11 and 12 hours a week on average, while home production References—2 
 
by men rose by 4.5 hours (Ramey 2007) (Aguiar and Hurst 2007).  In the wake of these changes, 
the production efficiencies realized by families have been eroded.   
Additionally, the costs of having such a specialist have also risen.   Women’s increased 
control over fertility (allowing them to better time and plan pregnancies), their improved access 
to education, and a decline in labor market discrimination have all led to higher market wages for 
women (Blau and Kahn 1997, 2000).  These higher wages represent a greater opportunity cost 
for a couple contemplating a stay-at-home spouse.  Further, changes in divorce law have made 
specialization in the home riskier (Stevenson 2007).  The declining relative value of production 
efficiencies from marriage decreases the value of marriage and, if this is the only relevant margin 
along which the value of family life is changing, it should lead to a decline in marriage rates 
overall.  Indeed, Greenwood and Guner (2008) develop a model in which technological change 
in  household  production  is  used  to  explain  the  fall  in  marriage  rates  since  World  War  II.  
However, these technological changes should not impact all women equally.  The Beckerian 
production efficiencies  model of the family is  consistent with an empirical fact of the time: 
college-educated women were the least likely group of women to marry in this period.  This fact 
is consistent with a model of the family in which many of the benefits of marriage arise from the 
greater efficiency achieved through household members specializing in either market or non-
market work.  Therefore women who are uninterested in, or not well-suited for, specializing in 
home production will have fewer gains from marriage.  Thus, these women will be less likely to 
find it in their interest to marry. 
As the gains from household specialization fall, so too does the relative advantage of 
marriage for women with less education (or more generally, women with fewer market skills).  
While we have witnessed a decline in marriage rates, it has been small relative to the large 
declines in specialized homemakers.  In 1970, among women with children under the age of 5, 
the  majority,  70%,  were  out  of  the  labor  force,  presumably  full-time  homemakers.    In  the 
ensuing decades, labor market participation became the norm for mothers with young children 
and only 36% were out of the labor force in 2006.  In contrast, the decline in marriage was less 
dramatic: in 1970 94% of women had married by age 40, declining to 84% by 2006.
2   
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One explanation for why marriage rates have not fallen further is that other dimensions of 
family life have become relatively more important and have also changed in absolute terms.  
Families have experienced an increase in leisure and consumption (Aguiar and Hurst 2007) that 
has likely increased the benefits of shared public goods.  Housing and health insurance costs, 
both important family public goods, have increased (Newhouse 1992) and (Glaeser, Gyourko 
and Saks 2005).  Moreover, there may be consumption complementarities that become more 
valuable as the time and money available to pursue consumption has risen (Lam 1988).  These 
changes in family life offer increased benefits from marriage, partly offsetting some of the loss 
of benefits stemming from the decrease in the returns to specialization.  Such changes in the 
returns to married life should impact not only the probability that matches form, but the type of 
matches that form.   
This  hypothesis  has  a  number  of  testable  implications.    This  first  implication  is  that 
marriage should become more common among those with more disposable income and/or more 
leisure time, relative to those with less.  The second is that in a consumption-based model of 
marriage, people will be more likely to marry someone with similar preferences, which will 
likely manifest itself in an increase in positive assortative mating along the dimensions of age, 
education background, and occupation.  The third is that, among couples without kids, their 
hours of work should become increasingly similar as the value of an hour of leisure is greater 
when it is coordinated with one’s spouse.  Childcare makes this coordination more complicated 
for those with children. And finally, similar (albeit oppositely signed) patterns should be seen for 
divorce, with divorce being less common among those who work similar hours and have more 
shared interests and more in common than among those who have little in common and little 
disposable income (with which to enjoy consumption complementarities).  
This paper focuses on establishing the facts behind the changes over recent decades in 
family formation, dissolution, and expansion by women’s education.  College-educated women 
used to be the least likely to marry, and today they are about as likely as those without a college 
degree to marry.  There are large racial differences in this trend with college-educated white 
women still less likely to marry than those with less education, while college-educated non-white 
women are the most likely to marry among non-whites.  Women of all educational backgrounds 
have delayed marriage,  although the delay  has  been significantly larger for the more highly 
educated.  The divorce rate initially rose for all groups but in recent decades has dropped off References—4 
 
more sharply for college graduates.  Lastly, while trends in the average number of children ever 
born have been similar across groups, the delay in fertility is concentrated almost exclusively 
among women who have attended college.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section II will examine trends from the 
1950s through to 2006 in the timing and propensity to enter marriage among women with a high 
school degree or less, those with some college, and those with a college degree.  The patterns of 
marriage and the differences by education differ significantly by race and thus we will examine 
white women separately from black women and will compare the patterns for both groups of 
women to the experiences of men.  Section III turns to marital stability, examining divorce and 
remarriage rates for women and men, separately by race and education, while Section IV focuses 
on changes in fertility.  Section V explores subjective well-being data and finds that there are 
important differences in marital and family happiness by education.  Section VI discusses the 
interpretation of the results, noting that many of the changes over time in family behavior by 
women’s  educational  attainment  may  simply  reflect  the  shift  of  many  women  into  high 
educational categories.  .  
II.  Marriage Patterns 
A  shift  from  production-based  marriage  to  consumption-based  marriage  should  make 
marriage more appealing to those with more disposable income relative to those with less.  Since 
personal and household income within a marriage is a bargained outcome reflecting the skills of 
each spouse and the preferences for home production and leisure, one would prefer to measure 
potential earnings.  A reasonable proxy for potential earnings is education and, as such, one 
would  similarly  predict  that  marriage  should  become  more  appealing  to  women  with  more 
education relative to those with less education.
3   
In addition, there is an important gender shift occurring.  Several decades ago, a woman 
earning a graduate degree was unlikely to find the old specialization model of marriage to be 
useful,  and  many  therefore  chose  to  remain  single.    But  a  modern  marriage  based  on 
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more likely to marry today than at any other time in the.  However, the gap has not closed as fast as predicted and 
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consumption complementarities is likely more enticing for educated women.
 4  On the flipside, 
less educated women have their own market opportunities available to them and have less to gain 
through  household  specialization  in  marriage  today  than  in  the  past,  and  the  new  model  of 
marriage based on consumption complementarities thrives when households have the time and 
resources to enjoy their lives. 
In addition to differences in the probability of ever marrying, there are differences by 
education  in  the  timing  of  first  marriage.    As  Becker  (1981)  argued,  those  who  plan  to  be 
specialist homemakers have an incentive to enter marriage early to begin to invest in their skills 
as a homemaker and reap the returns to specialization.  Among women who do not plan to be 
household specialists, this incentive is not present.  Indeed, it is likely that these women face an 
opposite incentive, to invest in their career before finding a spouse and children.  
In Figure 1 we start by examining the proportion of women who have ever-married, by 
age, among those with and without a college degree.  Examining the most recent large-scale 
data—the 2006 American Community Survey—we see in the first panel of Figure 1 that among 
white women, those with a college-degree are less likely to have ever-married and that this holds 
at every age.  A very different pattern is seen for black women in the second panel, for whom 
marriage  rates  are  highest  for  those  with  the  most  education  after  the  early  20s,  but  are 
significantly lower than those of whites, even among college-graduates.   
The data in Figure 1 point to the fact that for no generation of women have we witnessed 
a cross-over in which college-educated white women are marrying at higher rates compared to 
white women with less education.  For white women over the age of 40 there is a fairly stable 
gap in which college-educated women are around 4 percentage points less likely to have ever-
married compared with women with less education. The gap is larger for women in their 20s and 
smaller for women in their 30s reflecting the fact that college-educated women tend to marry 
later. 
 Yet,  the  “marriage  gap”  between  college-educated  women  and  their  less-educated 
counter-parts has been closing.  Figure 2 uses the decennial censuses of population from 1950 
through to 2000 to show the evolution over time in both the marriage gap and the timing of first 
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marriage for those with a high school degree or less, those with some college, and those with a 
college degree or more.  For each decade, the percent of women who have ever-married is shown 
for  each  age  and  educational  attainment.    In  the  earlier  decades  women  who  are  college 
graduates are clearly less likely to ever marry compared to women with less education.  The 
graphs show that marital behavior has changed both in terms of the timing of marriage in the life 
cycle and in the probability of ever marrying.  Examining the panels in Figure 2 we see that 
women with a college degree increasingly delayed marriage to older ages both earlier and to a 
greater extent than women with less education.  In 1970, 74% of 25 year old college graduates 
had ever-married; this compares to 53%, 43%, and 36% in 1980, 1990, and 2006 respectively.  
In contrast, the percent of 25 year old high school graduates who had ever-married was 90%, 
83%, 73%, and 54% in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2006 respectively.  Indeed, in the last 16 years 
there has been a larger decrease in marriage during the early 20s among women with less than a 
college degree than was seen in previous decades while there has been relatively little change 
among college-educated women.  The increased delay is consistent with the changing incentives 
affecting  individuals.    Technological  change  has  lowered  relative  cost  of  maintaining  a 
household as a single (Greenwood and Guner 2008).  The greater returns to education and 
experience increases the incentives to postpone potential career disruptions.  And a shift toward 
spousal matching on consumption and leisure preferences may lead to greater heterogeneity in 
matching and thus an increased benefit of time spent searching.  
The large gaps in marriage rates by education seen among women in their 20s dissipate 
through the 30s.  To get a sense of marital outcomes it is worth looking at women at older ages, 
as such we turn to the end data points in Figure 2, when the women are age 50.  For women born 
in 1900, 76% of those who were college-educated women had ever-married by age 50 in 1950.  
In contrast, 90% of high school graduates in this era had married by age 50.  Marriage rates for 
college-educated women grew rapidly from the 1950s and by 1980, 91% of the college-educated 
women had married by age 50.  During this period, marriage rates were also growing for women 
with less education—with 97% of high school graduates in 1980 married by age 50—however 
the gains were much smaller.  Thus, between 1950 and 1980, the closing of the educational 
marriage gap for white women was driven by large increases in the marriage rates of college-
educated women, much of which occurred at older ages. References—7 
 
Subsequent to 1980, there has been little change in the likelihood that college graduates 
will ultimately marry.  While this group continued to have further increases in the age of first 
marriage, much of this was made up for by higher marriage rates at older ages.  Indeed, between 
1980 and 2006 the percent ever-married among 50 year old college graduates fell by only 2 
percentage points; a similar change is seen among 40  year olds for whom the percent ever-
married  fell  by  4  percentage  points.    In  contrast,  among  50  and  40  year  old  high  school 
graduates,  over  this  period  the  percent  ever-married  fell  by  3  and  8  percentage  points 
respectively.  Among high school dropouts, the fall in marriage over the past quarter century was 
even greater, with a 7 percentage point decline in ever-married rates at age 50.  As can be seen in 
the bottom three panels of Figure 2, those with less education had larger relative declines in 
marriage between 1980 and 2000, and this trend continued through to 2006.  It is this relatively 
larger decline in marriage rates among those with less education that led to further decreases in 
the educational marriage gap since 1980. 
Two facts seen in Figure 2 are worth noting: among white women, while marriage rates 
have fallen overall in recent decades, they are still similar to that seen in the 1950s.  Indeed, 
among  those  with  a  high  school  degree,  by  age  40,  a  greater  percentage  had  entered  into 
marriage in 2006 than had done so in 1950.  A similar increase was seen among women with 
some college, while a small decrease occurred among high school dropouts.  Marriage rates 
immediately following World War II were at a historic high, leading to historically high ever-
married rates for women who were of marrying age during this period and thus, high ever-
married rates in the 1960 and 1970 Censuses (Stevenson and Wolfers 2007).   The second fact is 
that between 1950 and 1980 the percent ever-married plateaued and did so at a relatively early 
age.  In contrast, between 1990 and 2006 ever-married rates continue to increase long past 40.  
While some of this upward slope may simply reflect the decline in marriage among more recent 
cohorts, marriage rates among older adults have risen in recent decades and this likely explains at 
least some of the continued rise with age in the percent of those ever-married. 
As previously discussed, the age of first marriage has risen for all white women, but 
markedly more for those with a college degree.  In 2000, by age 22, 50% of white women with 
less than a high school degree had married, in comparison, the 50% threshold was crossed at age 
23,  24,  and  27  for  those  with  a  high  school  degree,  some  college,  and  a  college-degree, 
respectively.    Of  course,  some  education  may  occur  later  and  thus  the  younger  women’s References—8 
 
education is biased downwards, a factor that may exacerbate the differences in the age at first 
marriage  by  educational  attainment.    An  alternative  approach  is  to  use  marital  history  data 
among  older  women  to  look  retrospectively  at  the  age  they  married  and  their  ultimate 
educational attainment.  Since all but a few people who will complete college have done so by 
their late 20s, we examine 28-30 year old women in the 2004 SIPP.
5  This age group in the 2004 
SIPP also allows the most comparability with the cohort represented by the 2000 Census.  For 
these women, the age at which 50% had entered a first marriage was 23, 23, 24, and 26 for 
women with less than high school, high school, some college, and college, respectively.  The 
data  show  remarkably  similar  patterns,  suggesting  that  very  little  of  the  gap  in  age  at  first 
marriage  by  educational  attainment  is  due  to  educational  attainment  being  completed  after 
marriage. 
Thus, while white women with more education are increasingly postponing marriage, 
they  have  also  increased  their  likelihood  of  ever  marrying.    In  contrast,  women  with  less 
education are postponing marriage, albeit to a lesser extent, yet they have become somewhat less 
likely to ever marry.  What is less known is how much of this shift reflects the changes in the 
composition  of  women  in  each  of  the  educational  categories,  a  change  in  how  educational 
attainment may impact the desire or value of marriage for these women, or a change in how 
educational attainment affects the attractiveness of women to men in the marriage market.  We 
will return to these issues in section VI. 
A different picture emerges when we examine marital trends among African-American 
women by education.  Figure 3 shows the percent of black women  ever-married by age and 
education across the decades.  In the 1960s through to the 1980s the timing of marriage was 
similar  for  college-educated  African-American  and  white  women.    However,  black  female 
college graduates were more likely to marry compared with white college graduates and, starting 
in the 1970s, by the time they reached their early 30s, they were as likely to marry as other 
African-American women.  However, by 1990, black women with any college education were 
slightly more likely to ever marry compared with those with only a high school degree and this 
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age at which 50% of women aged 40-45 in the 2004 SIPP had married was 21, 21, 22, and 25 with less than high 
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trend continued through to 2006.  As with white women, this increase in marriage rates for 
college  graduates  relative  to  those  with  less  education  occurred  because  women  with  less 
education became increasingly unlikely to marry at a faster rate compared to those with more 
education.  Since black women with a college education had not been previously less likely to 
marry these shifts have led to a positive gap in which college-educated black women are more 
likely to marry than are black women with less education. 
There has been a larger decrease in marriage rates among black women of all educational 
backgrounds, and that decrease has been large relative to the decline in marriage among whites.  
While the ever-married rates of 40 year old white female college graduates fell only 4 percentage 
points between 1980 and 2006, the fall among black female college graduates was 17 percentage 
points.    Among  high  school  graduates  the  ever-married  rates  fell  by  24  percentage  points, 
compared  to  a  fall  of  8  percentage  points  among  whites.    Lastly,  the  graphs  show  that  the 
differential timing of entry into marriage by education that has eroded among African-American 
women in recent decades.  Those of all educational backgrounds are delaying marriage, and by 
2006, the gap in the percent of 25 year old black college and high school graduates who had 
ever-married was only 10 percentage points—almost half of that in 1980.    
Turning  to  men,  we  see  smaller  differences  in  marital  behavior  by  educational 
backgrounds than is seen for women.  As with women, more education is associated with a later 
age of marriage among men.   Figures 4 and 5 show ever-married rates by age and education for 
white  and  black  men,  respectively,  using  the  decennial  censuses  of  population  from  1960 
through to 2006.   Among white males, aside from a slightly later start to marriage, ever-married 
rates  show  little  difference  by  educational  attainment.    In  recent  decades,  white  men  have 
become  decreasingly  likely  to  marry  in  their  20s.    Between  1990  and  2006,  male  college 
graduates became slightly more likely than those with less education to ever marry and, as with 
women, overall men have become less likely to marry since 1980.   This gap emerged because 
while all groups of men became less likely to marry, the decrease in marriage among those with 
a college degree has been less than that of those with less education.   
A  similar  pattern  is  seen  among  black  men,  although  the  timing  differs  by  several 
decades.  Starting in 1980, black male college graduates became more likely than black high 
school graduates to marry.  This gap widened in the ensuing decades, a pattern that, as with 
whites, largely reflects declines in marriage among those with less education that exceeded the References—10 
 
declines seen for those with more education.  In 2006, college-educated black men in their forties 
were 5 percentage points less likely to have ever-married compared with college-educated white men, yet 
they were more likely to have married compared with black men with less education or compared to black 
women of any educational background.   Thus, as with whites, black college-educated men remain 
the most likely to marry among blacks.  Men’s role in market production has meant that the most 
highly  educated  men  are  desirable  matches  under  both  the  specialization  and  consumption 
models of marriage and they have the most gain from marriage either by forming a partnership 
with a home production specialist who will allow them to specialize in market production or by 
forming  a  consumption-based  marriage  with  a  person  who  shares  their  preferences  for 
consumption and leisure. 
In summary, for both men and women, marriage rates have declined since the 1980s 
among  people  of  all  educational  backgrounds.    However,  these  declines  have  been  steeper 
among those with less education.  Because college-educated white women had historically been 
less likely to marry, the shifts in marital behavior have led to a closing of the education gap in 
marriage for white women.  In contrast, among black women and men, these marital shifts have 
created a education gap in which those with more education have become more likely to marry.   
Among both men and women, the movement away from marriage has happened most sharply 
among blacks and while the shift has been somewhat smaller for those with more education, 
these differences are small compared to the overall shift.      
III.  Marital Stability 
Divorce rates rose for much of the 20th century, reaching a peak in 1979 (Stevenson and 
Wolfers 2007) and falling thereafter.  One explanation for the high divorce rates of the 1970s 
may be that this period reflected a transition, with many marrying the right partner for the old 
specialization model of marriage, only to find that pairing hopelessly inadequate in the modern 
consumption-based  marriage  (Stevenson  and  Wolfers  2008b).    As  such,  it  is  perhaps  not 
surprising that current divorce rates are similar to those witnessed at the end of the 1960s.  This 
fall in divorce rates is seen whether divorces are measured relative to the population or the stock 
of married people.  Moreover, examining individual marriages, those who have married in recent 
years  have  been  more  likely  to  stay  together  than  their  parents’  generation  (Stevenson  and 
Wolfers 2008a). References—11 
 
However,  these  patterns  have  not  occurred  equally  among  those  with  more  and  less 
education.  In general, divorce rates are lowest among those with a college-degree, yet are the 
highest for those with some college, while those with a high school degree or below have divorce 
rates that fall in-between the two groups.  These patterns have been largely stable over time, with 
divorce rates rising for all groups since the 1950s, and peaking, for most groups, in the 1970s. 
Figure  6  shows  the  proportion  of  women’s  marriages  ending  in  divorce  by  cohort  and 
educational  attainment.    The  top  row  shows  the  divorce  hazard  for  black  women  in  first 
marriages, while the bottom row shows white women in first marriages.
6  Figure 7 repeats this 
exercise for men.  Among those marrying in the 1950s, only 17% of the marriages of college-
educated women had ended after 25 years and this proportion was only slightly higher, 22%, for 
those with a high school degree or less.  Similar dissolution rates were seen among men, with 
20% of the first marriages of male college graduates ending within 25 years and 23% among 
those with a high school degree or less.  However, the marriages of high school graduates that 
did  end  tended  to  dissolve  earlier  in  the  marriage  compared  with  the  marriages  of  college 
graduates.  Thus, differences in marital survival were more extreme when looking after only a 
decade of marriage (see Table 1). 
Unfortunately, the last cohort for whom we can examine 25 years after their marriage are 
those marrying in the 1970s—the cohort for whom divorce was most likely.   For this cohort, 
there  was  also  little  difference  between  high  school  and  college  graduates  in  divorce  rates 
25 years after the marriage.  Among men and women with a high school degree or less, 44% 
percent of marriages had ended, while for those with a college degree 42% of women and 37% 
of men had divorced. 
Yet Figures 6 and 7 illustrate that there have been differential trends in divorce for those 
marrying in the 1980s and 1990s by education.  The high divorce rates of the 1970s continued 
into the 1980s for those with a high school degree or less and those with some college, while the 
divorce rate for those with a college degree was lower for those marrying in the 1980s.  This 
decrease in divorce is seen at 20 years, and to a lesser extent at 10 years, post-marriage.  The 
percentages for each are shown in Table 1.  It should be noted that for all groups the divorce rate 
in the first 5 years has not decreased, suggesting that divorces that do happen are increasingly 
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the average marital experience.  The patterns are similar for second marriages, however second marriages are more 
likely to end in divorce.   References—12 
 
happening  earlier  in  the  marriage.    Given  the  observed  differences  in  the  timing  to  divorce 
witnessed in earlier cohorts, it is difficult to forecast whether the educational differences will 
grow or shrink over time for those married in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Most of the discussion has compared the divorce rates of those with the least education 
with those with the most education.  However, the group with the highest divorce rate is men and 
women with “some college”.  This is equally true among blacks and whites and in some cohorts 
the differences are substantial.   Table 1 shows that among white women married in the 1970s, 
those with some college were 9 and 7 percentage points more likely to have divorced after 20 
years compared with those with a college degree and those with high school or less, respectively.  
For  white  men,  the  comparable  differences  were  9  and  6  percentage  points.    Even  larger 
differences are seen among blacks, with those with some college 11 and 15 percentage points 
more likely to have divorced after 20 years compared with male and female college graduates 
and 16 and 6 percentage points more likely to do so when compared to men and women with a 
high school degree or less.  These differences are just as stark examining those marrying in the 
1980s and 1990s.  The fact that it is those with “some college” that are the most at risk of divorce 
illustrates the potential role of selection in explaining why marital and divorce outcomes differ 
by educational attainment.  Those with “some college” have either attended a 2 year program or 
have failed to complete a 4-year program.
7  As such, among those with some college there is 
clearly negative selection among those with some college as they disproportionately represent 
those without the stamina or resources to complete their education.  It is perhaps not surprising 
that this group would have similar difficulties maintaining their marriage.  
In sum, both men and women with a college degree have been consistently less likely to 
divorce and have also experienced a larger decline in divorce probabilities in the last couple 
decades.  A different picture emerges, however, when we consider remarriage.  College-educated 
white women have historically been less likely than other women to remarry once divorced.  
Figure 8 shows remarriage hazards among divorced white women by  educational attainment 
calculated from marital  histories collected in 1971, 1980, 1995, and 2004.   In  each sample, 
college-educated women who divorce are both less likely and slower to remarry compared with 
less educated women.  Remarriage rates are falling over time for all groups of women, although 
the declines in remarriage rates have been greatest for those with less education.   
                                                       
7 Among adults in the 2000 census, around 78% of those with some college had received no degree. References—13 
 
Table 2 explores the probability of remarriage using probit regressions.  Across all years, 
college graduates are less likely to remarry.  However, adding controls for years since divorce 
and length of marriage reduces the coefficient on college.  Adding a further control for the age at 
marriage reduces the coefficient further.  Thus, much of the difference in remarriage rates for the 
most recent cohort can be explained by the differential patterns of first marriage.  The final 
columns in Table 2 show that remarriage has become relatively more likely for college graduates 
with the negative coefficient on college attenuating over time.   
Turning to black women and men of both races, we see that remarriage rates for these 
groups have fallen over time as well; however the patterns by education differ from that seen for 
white  women.    Figure  9  shows  the  remarriage  hazards  among  divorced  black  women  by 
educational attainment in 1971, 1980, 1995, and 2004.  Among black women there was little 
difference in remarriage rates by education in 1971.  By 1980, a gap had emerged in which black 
women with a high school degree or less had become less likely to remarry.  A similar drop in 
remarriage had occurred among those with any college and in the 1995 CPS data we can see 
little difference in remarriage rates by education for black women.  However, the remarriage 
rates for all groups have fallen.  The remarriage hazards for men by race and education are 
shown  for  1971  and  2004  in  Figure  11.    As  with  women,  for  both  white  and  black  men, 
remarriage rates have fallen between 1971 and  2004.  However, there is little difference by 
education for men in the probability of remarriage.    
Across gender and racial lines, we find that remarriage rates have actually gone down 
while the pool of divorced individuals has increased.  To provide further support for this finding, 
we investigate the likelihood of remarriage with the 1970 and 1980 Census samples, and the 
1991-3 and 2004 SIPP (questions used to infer remarriage from the Census were discontinued 
after 1980).  Table 3 shows that for every group, with and without controlling for age and age at 
first marriage, remarriages rates have gone down.  The surprising finding of a drop in remarriage 
rates at a time when the number of divorced individuals has increased is likely partially a result 
of rising cohabitation. 
Having examined the trends in the marital formation, dissolution, and reformation, we 
now briefly turn to the probability of being married at specific ages.   The growing difference in 
the patterns of marriage entry for women of different educational backgrounds combined with 
different patterns in divorce and remarriage rates has led to stark differences in the probability of References—14 
 
being married at specific ages.  In Figure 11, we show the percent of white women who are 
currently married by education.  In earlier decades, college graduates of all ages were less likely 
to be married.  By 1990, college graduates became about equally likely to be married at older 
ages, and since then, they have become more likely to be currently married at certain ages, a 
difference which has been increasing in magnitude and expanding to younger ages.  Looking 
more closely at the 2006 panel, we see that college graduates are less likely to be married in their 
20s, but by the time they are in their 30s they are more likely to be currently married and that gap 
holds for people throughout the 30s and early 40s and erodes thereafter.   
IV.    Fertility 
An even starker pattern of differences by education emerges when we examine patterns 
in fertility.  In the US there is a stark pattern of fertility declining with the education of mothers, 
with  those  with  the  most  education  having  the  fewest  children.    Examining  the  number  of 
children  in  the  household  for  white  women  from  1950-2006  by  age  and  level  of  education, 
Figure 12 shows the increase in children in the 1960s, 1970s, and the subsequent decline in 
fertility for women of all education categories.   A rise in mean age of mothers has been noted 
for some time, however, this figure clearly illustrates that most of that rise comes from a shift in 
the fertility patterns of more educated women.  In 1950, college graduates had the fewest number 
of children in the household at every point in the life cycle.  However, in subsequent decades, by 
the time women were older—in their early 40s or older—the number of young children in the 
homes of college graduates was similar to that of women with less education.  The change that 
has occurred over the past several decades is a steady decrease in the probability that college-
educated women have children in the home in their 20s and 30s.  Indeed, the age distribution of 
women with young children in the home among those with a high school degree or less has 
changed  little.    Much  of  the  delay  in  fertility  has  been  occurring  among  women  with  more 
education. 
Examining the last panel of Figure 12 more closely shows that in 2006, college-educated 
women are having fewer children overall.  These women are significantly delaying childbirth 
and have more young children in the household in their 40s, compared with women with less 
education.  Examining when mothers have an infant in the household, the median age for college References—15 
 
graduates is 32 years while 28 years for those with some college and 26 years for those who have 
never attended college.  
Because it is difficult to differentiate between a delay versus a permanent drop in fertility 
over time, we explore the differences in the amount of delay by looking at changes in the median 
age at which mothers have an infant in the household since 1950.   The median age did not rise at 
all for women with no college, versus 1 year for women with some college and 4 years for 
college graduates.  A similar pattern holds for black women.  The stark difference by education 
is consistent with the story that the returns to delaying fertility have increased for those at the top 
of the educational ladder. 
Turning now to changes in total fertility, we can only view the graphs on children in the 
household as suggestive, due to changes in divorce and remarriage, out-of-birth wedlock, and 
when children move out of the household.   To address trends in total fertility by education,  
 
Table 3: Remarriage Over time 
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Sample size  1503866  1503866  698836  96519  590483  71772   
Notes:  ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  (Robust standard errors in 
parentheses).  Census of Population 1970 and 1980.  Survey of Income Participation Program 1991-93 and 2004. 






Table 4 examines terminal fertility (the number of children ever born to 45-50 year old 
women)  across  the  decades  (the  Census  stopped  asking  this  question  in  1990  and  so  we 
supplement it with the 2004 SIPP).
8   For white women, the differential in the number of children 
ever born is consistent across time.   College graduates have the fewest children, followed by 
those with some college, high school graduates, and finally high school dropouts.  Fertility rose 
for all groups of 45-50 year olds from 1950-1980, and has decreased thereafter such that fertility 
rates in 2004 are similar, albeit slightly higher, to those seen in 1950 and 1960 for each education 
group.  However,  total  fertility  has  dropped  throughout  the  period,  as  women’s  educational 
attainment has risen with no subsequent erosion of the negative relationship between fertility and 
education.   
Among  black  women,  the  same  pattern  holds  by  education,  although  there  is  some 
evidence that fertility has dropped slightly for college graduates.  The rise in out-of-wedlock 
births among black  women is clearly being driven by  changes in marriage, not fertility: the 
number of children ever born by education is similar for 45-50 year old black women today as in 
1950  while  the  same  groups  has  experienced  an  almost  30  percentage  point  drop  in  ever 
marrying. 
The  direct  effects  of  greater  control  over  fertility  decisions  and  greater  access  to 
education and higher potential wages women can command from the workforce have altered the 
incentives  women  face.    They  have  increased  both  the  opportunity  cost  of  having  children 
overall and the costs of career disruption at earlier stages in the life cycle, and as a result, women 
are having children at later stages in their life.   Although only suggestive evidence has been 
provided that the costs to fertility have risen over time (Loughran and Zissimopoulos 2007), 
Miller  (2007)  shows  in  a  cross  section  of  women  that  delaying  fertility  increases  lifetime 
earnings, and the gains are highest for college graduates. 
 
V.  Marital Happiness 
Subjective well-being data can help us better understand the differences in the family 
experience between these groups.  Data from the General Social Survey (GSS) asks individuals 
                                                       
8 While it is possible for some women to have children after age 45, it is quite uncommon, indeed, early data did not 
capture fertility after age 45. References—17 
 
how satisfied they are with their family life and how happy they are with their marriage as well 
as other attitudinal questions.  Moreover, for a few years people are asked more generally about 
whether married people are happier than unmarried people.     
The GSS is a nationally representative sample of about 1,500 respondents each year from 
1972-1993 (except 1992), and continues with around 3,000 respondents every second year from 
1994 through to 2004, rising to 4,500 respondents in 2006.  Analyzing these data, we quickly see 
that the perceived benefits of marriage differ by education.  Four times as many non-college 
graduates as college graduates agree that “financial security is the main benefit of marriage”, and 
are  slightly  more  likely  to  agree  that  “children  are  the  main  purpose  of  marriage”.    Not 
surprisingly, those with a college degree are less likely to see “production complementarities” as 
the main benefit of marriage.  
Turning to marital happiness, we see in Table 4 that when people are asked generally 
whether married people are happier than unmarried people (1988, 1994, and 2002), there is a 
clear trend.  Consistent with the changing marital behavior patterns, we find some evidence that 
expectations over the value of marriage are changing by education; college-educated women are 
becoming  relatively  more  likely  to  believe  that  married  people  are  happier.    The  marital 
happiness data further reveal that men are typically happier in their marriages than are women.  
Similarly, Table 4 shows that men are more likely to believe that married people are happier than 
unmarried people. 
Turning to actual happiness in their marriage, Tables 5 and 6 show that people with more 
education are happier in their marriages and with their family life, just as they are more likely to 
think  that  married  people  are  happier  than  unmarried  people.    The  college  non-college 
differential is particularly stark for women.   
In Table 5 we run ordered probits by gender on how happy respondents are with their 
marriage.  College-educated white women have been consistently happier in their marriages with 
no apparent time trend in these differences.  However, the coefficient is reduced by forty percent 
when  we  add  controls,  a  reduction  which  is  being  driven  by  differences  in  the  number  of 
children, income, and parents’ education.  College-educated white men are also more likely to 
happier in their marriage compared with non-college educated white men, and this difference 
increases over time.  On the other hand, college-educated black men and women appear to be no 
more happy in their marriages than those without college degrees.   References—18 
 
Table  6  explores  how  much  satisfaction  respondents  get  from  their  family  life  by 
education  again  using  ordered  probits.    We  find  that,  as  with  marital  satisfaction,  college-
educated white women consistently get more satisfaction from their family life, although the 
relationship is being driven solely by college-educated white women who were married at the 
time of their interview.  Black college educated women do not appear to get any more satisfaction than 
those with no college, and we can reject that the black-white college estimates are the same when controls 
are  added.   However,  college  educated  black  and  white  men  get  more  satisfaction  at  a  marginally 
significant level without covariates although no difference is found for men of either group when controls 
are added.     
VI.  Discussion 
 As this paper has documented, the difference in family experience for women at the 
bottom and top of the educational distribution has changed significantly. However, while we 
have  provided  a  narrative  for  why  the  changing  incentives  faced  by  women  of  different 
educational levels (and the men who are matching with them) might have produced the trends in 
the data, it is unclear how much the shift reflects the changing causal effect of, or selection into, 
higher education.  Due to the substantial increase in educational attainment since 1950 (Table 8 
shows an over fourfold increase in college), a less dramatic subset of the selection effect might 
explain the trends in the percent that marry and the number of children ever born.  That is, it 
might be that the family behavior of the average women in each educational group in 1950 has 
not changed differentially, but only that the college graduate group in 2006 has expanded to 
include a certain segment of the population that were previously average non-college graduates.  
We investigate whether this “compositional effect” can be ruled out in explaining the changes by 
education in both the percent ever-married and the number of children ever born.   
The intuition behind this is similar to an Oaxaca decomposition, typically applied to wage 
differentials, where the explained component is changes in the composition of the group (Oaxaca 
1973).  To undertake this exercise, we assume that 1) college graduates in 2006 are comprised of 
all college graduates in 1950 with the remaining proportion average non-college graduates from 
1950 and 2) everyone is equally likely to marry in 2006 as the average women in the 1950 group 
to which they belong except for any across the board changes.  Formally, this amounts to  References—19 
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This exercise replicates almost perfectly the actually percent that ever marry in 2006 
(within  .3  and  .1  percentage  points  for  college  graduates  and  non-college  graduates, 
respectively), and therefore, we cannot rule out that a pure compositional effect drives the trends 
in the percent that ever marry.  On the other hand, we can rule out that a pure composition effect 
explains the trends in the average number of children ever born.  Compositional shifts can only 
explain about 69% of the change (the exercise overstates the actual change by 31%).  Instead, 
women must have changed their fertility behavior in a non-random manner vis-à-vis selection 
into college, whether it be causal or not. 
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Table 1:  Proportion of Marriages Ending in Divorce Within 10 & 20 Years of 
Marriage 
    Divorced by 10 years following 
marriage 
 
  Divorced by 20 years following 
marriage 
 
    White  Black    White  Black 
































































































































































































































         








         










         
                   
Notes:  2004 Survey of Income Participation. (standard errors in parentheses) 
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Table 2: Remarriage among White Women 
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Age at marriage      -.028*** 
(.002) 






Sample size  8319  8319  8319    8851  7303  5252 
Notes:  ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  (Robust standard errors in 
parentheses).  Marginal effects reported.  The 1971 CPS survey only asked about the first and most recent marriage.  
If individuals were married three or more times, we assumed their second marriage began halfway between the end 
of their first marriage and the beginning of their latest marriage. 
 
 
Table 3: Remarriage Over time 
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Sample size  1503866  1503866  698836  96519  590483  71772   
Notes:  ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  (Robust standard errors in 
parentheses).  Census of Population 1970 and 1980.  Survey of Income Participation Program 1991-93 and 2004. 






Table 4: Children Ever Born (Ages 45-50) 
  College  
Graduates 
Some College  HS Graduates  HS 
Dropouts 
All 
White Women           
1950  1.22  1.75  1.74  2.69  2.33 
1960  1.50    1.81  1.84  2.50  2.18 
1970  2.22    2.49  2.46  2.92  2.63 
1980  2.40    2.90  2.92  3.39  2.99 
1990  1.85    2.33  2.49  2.99  2.40 
2004  1.56    1.90  1.97  2.86  1.91 
Black Women           
1950  1.73  1.99  2.13  2.76  2.67 
1960  1.37    1.69  1.96  2.84  2.62 
1970  1.80    2.32  2.64  3.49  3.19 
1980  2.10    3.23  3.45  4.37  3.80 
1990  1.89    2.54  2.85  3.63  2.92 
2004  1.50    2.22  2.22  2.78  2.13 
Notes:  Census of Population (1950-1990) and Survey of Income and Program Participation (2004)  
The “Children Ever Born” question was asked in 1950 and 1960 of only women who had ever married.  To provide 
numbers that are representative of all women, the above statistics are constructed from the ever married women of 
1950 and 1960, and the never married women aged 65-70 and 55-60, respectively, from the 1970 Census.  The 








Table 5: Whether Married People are Happier than Unmarried People 
  Women      Men     
  Agree  Disagree  Neither  Agree  Disagree  Neither 
1988:             
College Graduate  47.4  11.1  41.6  62.2  5.6  32.2 
Non-College Graduate  53.7    14.7  31.6  57.8  12.5  29.7 
1994:               
College Graduate  46.6    17.8  35.6  57.8  8.0  34.2 
Non-College Graduate  45.2    19.0  35.8  48.5  22.2  29.3 
2002:               
College Graduate  50.7    19.5  29.9  47.9  18.8  33.3 
Non-College Graduate  37.4    24.9  37.8  49.2  17.5  33.3 
Notes:  GSS data .  Question: “Do you agree or disagree: Married People are Generally Happier than Unmarried 
People?”  The Agree category includes those that “strongly agree” and “agree” while the Disagree category includes 
those that “strongly disagree” and “disagree.”  The Neither category includes those who “can’t choose” and those 





Table 6: Marital Subjective Wellbeing 
Ordered Probit 
Regression 
    Dependent   Variable: “Taking things all together how 
would you describe your marriage?”  
[3] Very Happy [2] Pretty Happy  [1]Not Too Happy 
Regression Coefficients:  (1) 
 
(2)    (3)  (4) 








































Sample  Women 
 
  Men 
Controls:     ￿   ￿     
  White Women  Black Women    White Men  Black Men 
Percent Very Happy:           
College           
1970’s  74  59    70  49 
2000’s  67  55    74  51 
Non-College           
1970’s  66  46    70  55 
2000’s  59  55    63  54 
Notes:  ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Sample size for women is 
11228 and for men is 10111.  GSS data from 1973-2006. (Robust standard errors in parentheses)   
(a) Employment status includes indicators for full-time, part-time, temporary illness/vacation/strike, unemployed, 
retired, in school, keeping house, and other; Income is based on imputations of real family income, collapsed this 
variable into indicator variables, one for each decile; Children includes indicator variables for the number of 
children ever born, up to eight; Education variables are code the highest degree earned by the respondent, 
respondent’s father, and respondent’s mother, including separate variables for <high school, high school, 
associates/junior college, bachelor’s, or graduate degrees; Religion includes separate indicators for Protestant, 
Catholic, Jewish, None and Other; Region includes indicator variables for each of 9 regions. Separate dummy 












Table 7: Family Subjective Wellbeing 
Ordered Probit 
Regression 
Dependent   
Variable:  
“How much satisfaction do you get from your family 
life?” [7] A very great deal  [6] A great deal [5] quite a  bit 
[4] A fair amount [3] Some [2] A little [1] None 
Regression Coefficients:  (1) 
 
(2)    (3)  (4) 








































College*Married*white    .258*** 
(.070) 
    .073 
(.070) 
College*Married*black    -.250 
(.193) 
    -.277 
(.229) 
Married    .403*** 
(.030) 
    .933*** 
(.038) 
Sample  Women 
 
  Men 
Controls:     ￿   ￿     
  White Women  Black 
Women 
  White Men  Black Men 
Percent Very Great Deal:           
College           
1970’s  53  33    44  44 
1990’s  53  24    47  39 
Non-College           
1970’s  45  32    41  32 
1990’s  46  28    40  31 
Notes:  ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Sample size for women is 
11321and for men is 8699.  GSS data from 1973-1994.  (Robust standard errors in parentheses) 
 (a)  Employment status includes indicators for full-time, part-time, temporary illness/vacation/strike, unemployed, 
retired, in school, keeping house, and other; Income is based on imputations of real family income, collapsed this 
variable into indicator variables, one for each decile; Children includes indicator variables for the number of 
children ever born, up to eight; Education variables are code the highest degree earned by the respondent, 
respondent’s father, and respondent’s mother, including separate variables for <high school, high school, 
associates/junior college, bachelor’s, or graduate degrees; Religion includes separate indicators for Protestant, 
Catholic, Jewish, None and Other; Region includes indicator variables for each of 9 regions. Separate dummy 








Table 8: Educational Attainment (Ages 45-50) 
  College  
Graduates 
Some College  HS Graduates  HS 
Dropouts 
White Women         
1950  6  10  20  65 
1960    7  11  27  56 
1970    7  13  41  39 
1980    11  16  44  29 
1990    20  27  36  17 
2000    30  33  28  9 
2006    29  32  30  9 
Black Women         
1950  2  2  4  92 
1960    3  4  9  84 
1970    4  6  19  71 
1980    8  13  29  51 
1990    13  23  31  33 
2000    18  33  30  20 
2006    19  33  34  15 
Notes:  1950-2000 numbers are from the Censuses of Population.  2006 numbers are from the American 
Community Survey.  Each cell represents the percent of white or black 45-50 year old women with that educational 
attainment. 
Figure 1: Ever-married Rates by White and Black Women 
 
Source:   2006 American Community Survey 
Notes:   The percent who have ever married at each age are shown for those with and without a college degree for 
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Figure 2: Ever-married for White Women 
 
Source:   Census of Population 
Notes:   The percent who have ever married at each age are shown for those with high school or below, some 
college, or a college degree for white women. 
Figure 3: Ever-married for Black Women 
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Notes:   The percent who have ever married at each age are shown for those with high school or below, some 
college, or a college degree for black women. Because of small sample sizes we use a three-year moving average 
centered at each age in 1960 and 1970. 
 
Figure 4: Ever-married for White Men 
 
Source:   1960-2000 Censuses of Population and the 2006 American Community Survey 
Notes:   The percent who have ever married at each age are shown for those with high school or below, some 
college, or a college degree for White Men 
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Source:   1960-2000 Censuses of Population and the 2006 American Community Survey 
Notes:   The percent who have ever married at each age are shown for those with high school or below, some 
college, or a college degree for black men. Because of small sample sizes we use a three-year moving average 
centered at each age in 1960 and 1970. 
 
Figure 6: Percent Divorced for Women by Year of Anniversary 
   
Source:   2004 Survey of Income and Program Participation  
Notes:   Cohorts are in decade in which they married 
Figure 7: Percent Divorced for Men by Year of Anniversary 
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Notes:   Cohorts are in decade in which they married. 
 
 
Figure 8: Percent Remarried by Years since Divorce for White Women 
 
Source:  Current Population Survey (June 1971, 1980, and 1995) and Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (2004)  
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Source:  Current Population Survey (June 1971, 1980, and 1995) and Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (2004)  
 
Figure 10: Percent Remarried by Years since Divorce for Men 
 
Source:  Current Population Survey (June 1971) and Survey of Income and Program Participation (2004) 
 
Figure 11: Currently Married for White Women 
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Figure 12: Average Number of Children in the Household for White Women 
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